Situationist research in social psychology focuses on the situational factors that influence behavior. Doris and Harman argue that this research has powerful implications for ethics, and virtue ethics in particular. First, they claim that situationist research presents an empirical challenge to the moral psychology presumed within virtue ethics. Second, they argue that situationist research supports a theoretical challenge to virtue ethics as a foundation for ethical behavior and moral development. I offer a response from moral psychology using an interpretation of (...) Xunzi—a Confucian virtue ethicist from the Classical period. This Confucian account serves as a foil to the situationist critique in that it uncovers many problematic ontological and normative assumptions at work in this debate regarding the prediction and explanation of behavior, psychological posits, moral development, and moral education. Xunzi’s account of virtue ethics not only responds to the situationist empirical challenge by uncovering problematic assumptions about moral psychology, but also demonstrates that it is not a separate empirical hypothesis. Further, Xunzi’s virtue ethic responds to the theoretical challenge by offering a new account of moral development and a ground for ethical norms that fully attends to situational features while upholding robust character traits. (shrink)

Late in 1990, the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions at Illinois Institute of Technology (lIT) received a grant of more than $200,000 from the National Science Foundation to try a campus-wide approach to integrating professional ethics into its technical curriculum.! Enough has now been accomplished to draw some tentative conclusions. I am the grant's principal investigator. In this paper, I shall describe what we at lIT did, what we learned, and what others, especially philosophers, can learn (...) from us. We set out to develop an approach that others could profitably adopt. I believe that we succeeded. (shrink)

I develop a taxonomy of various approaches to leadership which I label the ethical decision-making, managerial obligation, role typology, and creativity conceptions of leadership. Each approach makes distinctive assumptions about the task and educational responsibilities in educating for ethical leadership. Although each of these approaches are extremely valuable, I find them limited in that they all rely on what I call an agentic model. Using the concepts of choice architects and choice architecture from nudge theory, I argue for a new (...) metaphysical model—a systems-design model—that captures the complex and interactive dynamic of a host of metaphysical entities and contextual factors. This new metaphysical model of the context of leadership and the function of leaders within it yields a theory of leadership, which I dub the ethical systems-design conception of leadership. (shrink)

I develop a taxonomy of various approaches to leadership which I label the ethical decision-making, managerial obligation, role typology, and creativity conceptions of leadership. Each approach makes distinctive assumptions about the task and educational responsibilities in educating for ethical leadership. Although each of these approaches are extremely valuable, I find them limited in that they all rely on what I call an agentic model. Using the concepts of choice architects and choice architecture from nudge theory, I argue for a new (...) metaphysical model—a systems-design model—that captures the complex and interactive dynamic of a host of metaphysical entities and contextual factors. This new metaphysical model of the context of leadership and the function of leaders within it yields a theory of leadership, which I dub the ethical systems-design conception of leadership. (shrink)

The primary problem we face when educating for social justice involves making problems and issues ‘real’ in ways that enable deep comprehension of the nature of injustice, the effects of systemic and dynamic causes, and the interaction of structures and policies on the lives of individuals. To address this problem, I examine work from behavioral economics and moral psychology as theoretical resources. I argue that we can glean insights from the notions of behavioral nudges and virtue labeling and propose a (...) new account of nudges, which I call experiential nudges. Experiential nudges provide an important mechanism in educating for social justice, in particular, and can be extended within moral education more broadly. (shrink)

The primary problem we face when educating for social justice involves making problems and issues ‘real’ in ways that enable deep comprehension of the nature of injustice, the effects of systemic and dynamic causes, and the interaction of structures and policies on the lives of individuals. To address this problem, I examine work from behavioral economics and moral psychology as theoretical resources. I argue that we can glean insights from the notions of behavioral nudges and virtue labeling and propose a (...) new account of nudges, which I call experiential nudges. Experiential nudges provide an important mechanism in educating for social justice, in particular, and can be extended within moral education more broadly. (shrink)

I describe four different approaches to ethics education that are commonly implemented in Ethics Across the Curriculum programs: the Case-based, Internalist, Supplementation, and Responsibilist. This typology is useful to categorize the range of institutional practices. As our Society moves into its next twenty years, I consider what we have learned about ethics education and whether we should promote a particular approach. I use a literary resource to shift our perspective and a philosophical resource to introduce a new structure. Using insights (...) from these resources, I offer two proposals. First, I develop a theoretical proposal for an integrated model of ethics education that I call the Comprehensive Ethics Education model. Second, I offer two pedagogical proposals for use in quantitative courses and degree programs as well as institution-wide EAC programs. (shrink)

Because we automatically categorize individuals into members of in- or outgroups based on their perceived similarity to us, our social identity creates limitations and bias in our thinking. I examine the ways in which banal nationalism, cultural identifications, and group membership influence our thinking, the assumptions we hold, and the intuitions we form. If our goal is to engage in ethics without borders—a laudable goal—then we must uncover the ways in which our thinking is limited and consider strategies to escape (...) or transcend such borders in our theoretical work and teaching. I offer two proposals using insights from cross-cultural psychology. First, I propose the acronym of WASPI as a description of the nonreflective assumptions held by many WEIRD university professors. Second, I offer a four-factor model of normative analysis as a concrete tool for our teaching and theoretical work. It is only through such processes of active and critical reflection that our goal of ethics without borders can succeed. (shrink)

Situationist research highlights the fact that situational features often influence our behavior in unexpected ways. Virtue ethicists tend to think they can explain away such results, and prescribe cultivating virtue to ward against such moral failings. Situationists argue that studies like these uncover deep flaws within the moral psychology presumed by virtue ethicists, and hold that virtues may be an inadequate grounding for moral behavior and moral education. Using the concept of cognitive scripts from psychology, I describe a new approach (...) to moral education. The course focuses activities on written and performed scripts to encourage students to imagine hypothetical scenarios in real time, adopt the perspectives of others, evoke and alter their emotions, and ultimately, to revise their implicit, cognitive scripts. Attending to and altering cognitive scripts not only captures many theoretical and empirical insights from virtue ethics and situationism, but also offers a more sophisticated model of moral psychology and a better approach to moral education. (shrink)